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Summary
Elections in 2005 for a transitional National Assembly and government (January
30, 2005), a permanent constitution (October 15), and a permanent (four year) Council
of Representatives and government (December 15) were concluded  despite insurgent
violence and attracted progressively increasing Sunni participation.  However,
escalating sectarian violence and factional infighting have delayed formation of a new
government.  (See CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance and Security,
by Kenneth Katzman.)
Shortly after Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) deposed Saddam Hussein’s regime in
April 2003, the Bush Administration linked the end of U.S. military occupation to the
completion of a new constitution and the holding of national elections, tasks expected to
take two years.  Prominent Iraqis persuaded the Administration to accelerate the process,
and sovereignty was given to an appointed government on June 28, 2004, with a
government and a permanent constitution to be voted on thereafter, as stipulated in a
Transitional Administrative Law (TAL, signed March 8, 2004), as follows:1
! The elections held on January 30, 2005 were for a 275-seat transitional
National Assembly; a provincial assembly in each of Iraq’s 18 provinces
(41 seats each; 51 for Baghdad); and a Kurdistan regional assembly (111
seats).  The Assembly chose a transitional “presidency council” (a
president and two deputies), a prime minister with executive power, and
a cabinet.  
! The transitional Assembly was to draft a constitution by August 15,
2005, to be put to a referendum by October 15, 2005.  The draft could be
vetoed with a two-thirds majority of the votes in any three provinces.  A
permanent government would be elected by December 15, 2005, and it
would take office by December 31, 2005.  If a constitution was defeated,
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the December 15 elections would be for another transitional National
Assembly (which would draft a new constitution). 
January 30 Elections 
The January 30, 2005 elections, run by the “Independent Electoral Commission of
Iraq” (IECI), were conducted by proportional representation (closed list); voters chose
among “political entities” (a party, a coalition of parties, or individuals).  Seats in the
Assembly and the provincial assemblies were allocated in proportion to a slate’s showing;
any entity receiving  at least 1/275 of the vote (about 31,000 votes) won a seat.  A female
candidate occupied every third position on electoral lists in order to meet the TAL’s goal
for at least 25% female membership.  A total of 111 entities were on the National
Assembly ballot:  9 multi-party coalitions, 75 single parties, and 27  individual persons.
The 111 entities contained over 7,000 candidates.  About 9,000 candidates, organized into
party slates, ran in provincial and Kurdish elections.  
In the January 30 (and December 15) elections, Iraqis abroad were eligible to vote.
The International Organization for Migration (IOM) was tapped to run the “out-of-country
voting” (OCV) program.  OCV took place in Australia, Canada, Denmark, France,
Germany, Iran, Jordan, Sweden, Syria, Turkey, UAE, Britain, Netherlands, and the United
States.  (See [http://www.iraqocv.org].)  About 275,000 Iraqi expatriates (dual citizens
and anyone who can demonstrate that their father was Iraqi) registered, and about 90%
of them voted (in January). 
There were  about 14 million eligible voters (15 million in the two subsequent votes
in 2005).  Voters need to be at least 18 years old.  There were about 5,200 polling centers
in January, and 6,200 in the December elections, both staffed by about 200,000 Iraqis.
Monitoring was limited in both elections; in January, a Canada-led contingent of about
25 observers from eleven nations based in Jordan, which assessed  reports on the voting
by about 50,000 Iraqi monitors.  (One of the international observers was in Iraq).  In the
December election, some European parliament members and others contributed to the
monitoring of the voting.  
The Iraqi government budgeted about $250 million for the January elections, of
which $130 million was offset by  international donors, including about $40 million from
the European Union.  Out of  $21 billion in U.S. reconstruction funds, the United States
provided $40 million to improve IECI capacity; $42.5 million for Iraqi monitoring; and
$40 million for political party development, through the International Republican Institute
and National Democratic Institute.  OCV cost an additional $92 million, of which $11
million was for the U.S. component, but no U.S. funds were spent for OCV.
Competition and Results. The Iraqi groups that took the most active interest in
the January elections were those best positioned: Shiite Islamist parties, the Kurds, and
established secular parties.  The most prominent slate was the Shiite Islamist “United Iraqi
Alliance” (UIA), consisting of 228 candidates from 22 parties, primarily the Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and the Da’wa Party.  It was backed
by Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.  The first candidate on this slate was SCIRI leader Abd
al-Aziz al-Hakim;  Da’wa leader Ibrahim al-Jafari was number seven.  Even though
radical Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr denounced the election as a U.S.-led process, 14 of
his supporters were on the UIA slate; eight of these won seats.  The two main Kurdish
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2 For information on  these groups, see CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: Post-Saddam Governance
and Security, by Kenneth Katzman.
parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party
(KDP) offered a joint 165-candidate “Kurdish Alliance” list.  Interim Prime Minister Iyad
al-Allawi filed a six-party, 233-candidate “Iraqi List” led by his Iraqi National Accord
(INA) party.  The Communist Party filed a 257-candidate “People’s Union” slate.2 
Sunni Arabs (20% of the overall population), perceiving electoral defeat and
insurgent intimidation, mostly boycotted and won only 17 seats spread over several lists.
The relatively moderate Sunni “Iraqi Islamic Party” (IIP) filed a 275-seat slate, but it
withdrew in December 2004.  The hard-line Iraqi Muslim Scholars Association (MSA),
said to be close to the insurgents, called for a Sunni boycott.  
Violence was far less than some anticipated; insurgents conducted about 300 attacks,
but no polling stations were overrun.  Polling centers were guarded on election day by the
130,000 members of Iraq’s security forces, with the 150,000 U.S. forces in Iraq  available
for backup.  Two days prior to election day, vehicle traffic was banned, Iraq’s borders
were closed, and polling locations were confirmed.  Security measures were similar for
the October 15 and December 15 votes, although with more Iraqi troops and police
available (about 215,000) than in January. 
Total turnout in January was about 58% (about 8.5 million votes); results are in
Table 1.  After the election, factional bargaining over governmental posts and
disagreements over Kurdish demands for substantial autonomy  delayed  formation of the
government.  During April and May, the factions formed a government that U.S. officials
said was not sufficiently inclusive of the Sunni minority, even though it had a Sunni
(Hajim al-Hassani) as Assembly speaker; a Sunni deputy president (Ghazi al-Yawar); a
Sunni deputy prime minister (Abd al-Mutlak al-Jabburi);  a Sunni Defense Minister
(Sadoun Dulaymi); and five other Sunni ministers.  The Sunnis complained that their
ministerial slots (other than Defense) were relatively unimportant, such as the ministries
of culture and of women’s affairs.  The other major positions were dominated by Shiites
and Kurds, such as PUK leader Jalal Talabani as president;  Da’wa leader Ibrahim al-
Jafari as Prime Minister; SCIRI’s Adel Abd al-Mahdi as the second deputy president;
Bayan Jabr as Interior Minister, which controls the police and police commando forces;
and KDP activist Hoshyar Zebari as Foreign Minister.  Chalabi and KDP activist Rosch
Shaways were named as the two other deputy prime ministers.  There is also one Christian
and one Turkoman minister.  In provincial elections, the Kurds won about 60% of the
seats in Tamim (Kirkuk) province (26 out of 41 seats), strengthening the Kurds’ efforts
to gain control of the province.  
Permanent Constitution and Referendum
The next step in the transition process was the drafting of a permanent constitution.
On May 10, the National Assembly appointed a 55-member drafting committee, with a
SCIRI  official, Humam al-Hammoudi, as chair.  The committee included only two Sunni
Arabs, prompting Sunni resentment, and 15  Sunnis  (and one member of the small Sabian
community) were later added as full committee members, with 10 more as  advisors.
Missing the August 15 deadline to produce a draft, the talks  produced a document on
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August 28 that included some compromises sought by Sunnis, and the Shiites and Kurds
declared it final.  The Kurds achieved a major goal; Article 136 sets December 31, 2007,
as a deadline for resettling Kurds in Kirkuk and holding a referendum on whether Kirkuk
will join the Kurdish region.
The draft (Article 2)3 designated Islam “a  main source” of legislation and said no
law can contradict the “established” provisions of Islam.  Article 39 implied that families
could choose which courts to use to adjudicate domestic issues such as divorce and
inheritance, and Article 34 made only primary education mandatory.  These provisions
provoked opposition from women who fear that the males of their families will decide to
use Sharia (Islamic law) courts for family issues and for girls’ education.  The 25%
electoral goal for women was retained (Article 47).  Article 89 said that federal supreme
court will include experts in Islamic law, as well as judges and experts in civil law.
Sunni negotiators, including chief negotiator Saleh al-Mutlak of the National
Dialogue Council opposed the August 28 draft because it  allowed two or more provinces
together to form new autonomous “regions.”  Article 117 allowed each “region” to
organize internal security forces, which would legitimize the fielding of sectarian militias,
in addition to the Kurds’ peshmerga, which were  allowed by the TAL.  Article 109
required the central government to distribute oil and gas revenues from “current fields”
in proportion to population, implying that the regions might ultimately control revenues
from new energy  discoveries.  These provisions raised Sunni alarms, because their areas
have no known oil or gas deposits.  Article 62 establishes a “Federation Council” — a
second chamber of a size and with powers to be determined — presumably to review
legislation affecting the regions. 
After further  negotiations, on September 19, 2005, the National Assembly approved
a “final” draft, with some modifications that Sunnis wanted, including clarifying
government control over water rights, and a statement that Iraq has always been part of
the Arab League.  The United Nations subsequently printed and distributed 5 million
copies of the draft.  Ending their political boycott, Sunnis registered in  large numbers
(70%-85% in some Sunni cities) in an effort to try to defeat the constitution.  The
continued Sunni opposition  prompted U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad to
mediate an agreement (October 11) between Kurdish and Shiite leaders and a major Sunni
party, the Iraqi Islamic Party, providing for (Article 137) a panel to convene after the
installation of a post-December 15 election government and, within four months, propose
a bloc of amendments.  The amendments require a majority Assembly vote of approval
and, within another two months, would be put to a public referendum under the same
rules as the October 15, 2005, referendum.  The major assumption of the deal is that
Sunnis would be politically strengthened by their participation in the December 15
election and would be well positioned to achieve adoption of amendments. 
The  referendum was relatively peaceful, with total turnout about 60% (about 10
million voting), suggesting high  Sunni turnout.  Final results (released October 25)
nationwide were  78.6% in favor and 21.4% against.  The mostly Sunni provinces of
Anbar and Salahuddin had a 97% and 82% “no” vote, respectively.  The mostly Sunni
province of Nineveh voted 55% “no.”  Diyala province, believed mostly Sunni, had a
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slight majority “yes” vote (51%).  The draft was declared adopted because only two
provinces, not three, voted “no” with a 2/3 majority.  The Administration praised the vote
as evidence that Sunnis were moving into the political process.  
December 15, 2005, Elections
Under a July 2005 election law, for the December 15 elections each province
constituted an election constituency and contributed a fixed number of seats to the new
“Council of Representatives.”  Of the 275-seat body, 230 seats were  allocated that way,
and there were  45 “compensatory” seats for entities that did not win provincial seats but
garnered votes nationwide, or which would have won additional seats had the election
constituency been the whole nation.  The altered format was intended to improve the
prospects for Sunnis to win seats.  A total of 361 political “entities”  registered: 19 of
them were coalition slates (comprising 125 different political parties), and 342 were other
“entities” (parties or individual persons).  About 7,500 candidates spanned all entities.
  
Most notably for U.S. policy, major Sunni slates competed.  Most prominent was the
three-party “Iraqi Concord Front,” comprising  the IIP,  the National Dialogue Council,
and the Iraqi People’s General Council.  In contrast to the January election, the UIA slate
formally included  Sadr’s faction (about 30 candidates on the slate) as well as other harder
line Shiite parties  Fadila (Virtue) and Iraqi Hizballah.  Ahmad  Chalabi’s Iraqi National
Congress ran separately.  Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani’s office tacitly, but not publicly,
endorsed the UIA slate.  Former Prime Minister Iyad al-Allawi’s mostly secular 15-party
“Iraqi National” slate was broader  than his January list, incorporating not only his Iraq
National Accord  but also the Communist Party, Yawar’s “Iraqis” party, and Adnan
Pachachi’s “Independent Democratic Gathering.”  The  “Kurdistan Alliance” slate was
little changed from January.  
Turnout was about 70%, mostly because of a Sunni vote that exceeded 50%.
Violence was minor (about 30 incidents) as some Sunni insurgents, supporting greater
Sunni representation in parliament, helped guard rather than disrupt the voting.  Results
suggest that voters appear to have chosen lists representing their sects and regions and did
not support secular, non-sectarian lists.  The table gives final results that were released
on January 20, 2006, and court-certified on February 10, 2006.  According to the
constitution, the timetable for subsequent government formation should be as follows: 
! within 15 days of certification (February 25), the Council of
Representatives was to convene  to select a speaker and two deputy
speakers.  (The Council convened on March 16 to be sworn in, but it did
not select a Speaker or any other Council leadership positions);
! after choosing a Council speaker the Council is to select  (no deadline
specified, but a thirty-day deadline for the choice after subsequent
Council elections), a presidency council for Iraq (President and two
deputies).  Those choices require a 2/3 vote of the Council; 
! within another 15 days, the presidency council (by consensus of its three
officials) is to designate the “nominee of the [Council] bloc with the
largest number” as Prime Minister, the post that has executive power;
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! within another 30 days, the prime minister designate names a cabinet for
approval by majority vote of the Council.
The UIA and the Kurds were well positioned to continue their governing alliance;
combined they have 181 seats, just shy of the 184 (two-thirds) needed to name a
presidency council, but they could probably recruit small allied parties (pro-Sadr Shiites
or Islamist Kurds) to exceed that threshold.  However, their alliance has frayed over the
UIA’s February 12 nomination of Jafari to continue as Prime Minister.  In an internal UIA
poll, Jafari fended off  a challenge by SCIRI’s Adel Abd al-Mahdi, by one vote, largely
because Moqtada al-Sadr  threw his support to Jafari.  With senior U.S. officials urging
formation of  a “unity government” as soon as possible, the Kurds, Sunni groupings, and
Allawi’s bloc, reportedly with U.S. backing, have  jointly sought to reverse the Jafari
choice on the grounds that he has been ineffective in securing Iraq and is too close to
Sadr.  In  a March 30, 2006, interview with the New York Times, Jafari criticized what he
called U.S. interference with the “democratic process” to oppose him and said he is trying
to coax Sadr’s Mahdi Army and other militias into the legitimate Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF).  Militias such as that of  Sadr are widely blamed for the growing sectarian violence
that has reportedly claimed over 1,000 Iraqi lives since the February 22 bombing of the
Shiite Askariya mosque in Samarra.  The Kurds have nominated Talabani to continue as
president, and no challengers to him have emerged to date, but the dispute over Jafari,
coupled with clashes between Sadr militiamen and U.S. forces in March 2006, has
delayed progress on formation of the government.  On the other hand, in March 2006,
Iraqi leaders agreed to a U.S. proposal to form an overarching economic and security
council, representing all factions but not provided for in the constitution. 






UIA (Shiite Islamist); Sadr formally joined list for Dec. vote
(Of the 128 seats: SCIRI ~ 30; Da’wa ~ 28; Sadr ~ 30; others, remainder)
140 128
Kurdistan Alliance (PUK and KDP)  75 53
Iraqis List (secular, Allawi); added some mostly Sunni parties for Dec. vote 40 25
Iraq Concord Front (Sunni).  Main Sunni bloc; not in Jan. vote  — 44
Dialogue National Iraqi Front (Sunni, Saleh al-Mutlak)  Not in Jan. vote  — 11
Iraqi National Congress  (Chalabi).  Was on UIA list in Jan. 05 vote  — 0
Iraqis Party (Yawar, Sunni); Part of Allawi list in Dec. vote 5  — 
Iraqi Turkomen Front  (Turkomen, Kirkuk-based, pro-Turkey) 3  1 
National Independent and Elites Cadre (Jan)/Risalyun (Mission, Dec) Shiite,
pro-Sadr
3 2 
People’s Union (Communist, non-sectarian); on Allawi list in Dec. vote 2  — 
Kurdistan Islamic Group  (Islamist Kurd)  2  5
Islamic Action  (Shiite Islamist, Karbala)  2 0
National Democratic Alliance (non-sectarian, secular)  1  — 
Rafidain National List  (Assyrian Christian) 1 1
Liberation and Reconciliation Gathering  (Sunni, secular) 1 3 
Ummah (Nation) Party.  (Secular, Mithal al-Alusi, former INC activist) 0 1
Yazidi list (small Kurdish, heterodox religious minority in northern Iraq)  — 1
